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The Measurement of Retail Output and the Retail Revolution
The computerization of retailing has made price dispersion a norm in the United States,
so that any given list price or transactions price is an increasingly imperfect measure of a
product’s resource cost. As a consequence, measuring the real output of retailers has become
increasingly difficult. Food retailing is used as a case study to examine data problems in retail
productivity measurement. Crude direct measures of grocery store output suggest that the CPI for
food-at-home may have been overstated by 1.4 percentage points annually from 1978 to 1996.The Measurement of Retail Output and The Retail Revolution
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an exploration of the law of one price and the consequences of its violation
for the measurement of output and price. Jevons’s law of one price is simply that “in the same
open market, at any one moment, there cannot be two prices for the same kind of article.”
(Jevons,1879, in Wilson, 1964) This unique price in turn will reflect resource cost in a
competitive market. Thus the law of one price implies that prices are a useful measure of
resource cost. 
 The paper focuses on the retail revolution as the source of the violation of the law of one
price and the difficulties this creates for measuring retail productivity. The retail revolution,
which began in earnest in the late 1970s, is the rapid automation of retail transactions processing
made possible by computerization (the lineaments of this revolution were first descried in the
work of Bluestone et al, 1981). Computerization of retail transactions -- a process drastically
accelerated by the widespread adoption of scanners by retailers over the course of the 1980s --
has facilitated the ability of retailers to i) cheaply and efficiently vary prices, ii) offer an
increasing variety of products, and iii) analyze in detail the price elasticities of demand for
products.  As a consequence, computerization has accelerated a process of product differentiation
in which characteristics of products that are not particularly relevant to the production cost of the
product are used to allocate costs to appropriately elastic consumers. For example, whether or not
the two halves of a round trip by air are separated by a Saturday night is scarcely relevant to the 
production cost of the flights, but this restriction separates price inelastic business travelers from
price elastic vacation travelers. Another example is Black Friday, the day after Thanksgiving in2
America when winter goods are widely discounted. If anything, direct sales costs are higher on
this traditional vacation weekend, but economies of scale for shoppers on that day make it a focal
point to separate shoppers with low search costs from shoppers with high search costs.  
In both the cited examples, from the perspective of productivity measurement, the correct
price is the weighted average price rather than either the high price or the low price, as will be
shown in the next section. Correctly measuring productivity requires knowing the quantities sold
at the two prices, particularly when pricing practices are changing. 
Price discrimination has become very widespread in retailing.  Other rapidly changing
aspects of retailing include longer hours of operation, increases in product variety (rapid
increases in store-keeping units and UPC codes),  information exchange technology (scanners
and electronic data interchange), inventory management (just-in-time inventory techniques and
inventory management by manufacturers),  retail outlets (buying clubs and category killers), and
retail environments (regional malls and selling floor space).  The speed of these changes in
retailing, which themselves are in large part due to reduced costs of information processing,
communication, and transportation, weakens the a priori case for the standard method of
deflation. 
When inflation is incorrectly measured, real output measures of retail stores are
misleading. This can be corrected, although only crudely and in part, by looking at quantitative
measures of retail service provision. Accurate measurement of inflation and productivity is likely
to require ongoing research efforts as retail practices evolve.
One aspect of this problem that has been repeatedly recognized is the product life cycle.
The 1960 NBER Price Statistics Review Committee (1961), chaired by Stigler, wrote:3
New products are usually introduced at relatively high prices and their prices fall
as they gain acceptance, owing to economies of producing them on a larger scale
and to improvement in the technique of production that come with time and
experience. The price of a mature product or service is likely to be at the lowest
level in its history relative to other prices. Finally, in the “old age” of a product, its
relative price will often tend to rise as the scale of production contracts and
economies of scale are reduced. (p.39)
The “old age” phase is one in which, although the product remains in “competition” with
new products that are replacing it, its rising price is not a symptom of a general price rise or of an
increase in the cost of living, but of its failure to compete successfully. Here the law of one price
fails to hold between the mature product and similar competitors; this is discussed further in
section II. The retail revolution has the effect of accelerating the rate of product introduction and
speeding up the product life cycle, producing an acceleration in price mismeasurement in
addition to that due to the multiple pricing at any given stage of the product life cycle discussed
above.
II. THEORY WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
 The importance of the law of one price for the measurement of price and output can be
seen in the following example. Suppose there are two goods, an old good and a new good. In
1980, the old good has a price of $10 and the new good has a price of $5. Ten years later, the old
good’s price has risen to $12 while the new good’s price is unchanged. If the law of one price
holds, then the old good and the new good are evidently different goods since they have different
prices. But if the law of one price fails to hold, because the old good and the new good are cases
of Coca Cola being sold by discounters, one efficient and growing (WalMart, for example) and
the other inefficient and failing, then they are not different goods.4
Assume that consumers have shifted from the old good to the new good as shown in
Table 1. The question is, how should we measure inflation and output growth? If the two
different products are different goods, whose relative value to the consumer is reflected by their
relative prices and quantities, then the price level has risen as in line 4 of Table 2, where we use
the 1980 quantity weights to weight the price movements. If the two products are the same good,
then the price level has fallen because the average unit price has fallen (last line, Table 1). How
do we know when goods are the same good or different goods?  The answer is that, if we cannot
rely on the law of one price, we need additional information about the products and how
consumers value what differentiates them. But the choice makes a substantial difference in how
we measure output (Table 3).  
As discussed in the next section, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) considers items
sold at different outlets to be different goods when calculating the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
When a store with an obsolete retail technology that sells goods at a stable high price is replaced
by one with a superior technology that sells them at a stable low price, then the switch implies,
given the BLS methodology, a decline in output with a stable price rather than a decline in price.
Thus retail efficiency is mistaken for inefficiency. This point was made by Denison (1962) and
Reinsdorf’s (1993) seminal article picked up this theme with respect to grocery store prices.
Dulberger (1993), in the same NBER volume as Reinsdorf, made the same point for
semiconductors, where inflation mismeasurement has been spectacular.  It applies to airfares and
prescription drugs, Pashigian’s (1988) work on department store pricing, telecommunications,
Shepard’s (1991) work on gasoline stations, and to the fast food market. 
One firm, one good. Under the law of one price, there is a single price, p, with resource5
cost c(q). Total revenue, given quantity q is pq. Profit is pq - qc(q). If the zero profit condition
holds, then p=c(q), and price is a direct measure of resource cost. If the law of one price fails,
then the firm may sell the good for several different prices, p(i), i =1 . . . n, with quantities q(i)
sold at each price. Then profit is 3 p(i)q(i) - qc(q), where q = 3 q(i). By assumption, cost does
not vary with price: that is the essence of the violation of the law of one price. Under the zero
profit condition, the weighted average price equals resource cost, 3 p(i)q(i)/q =c(q).
Suppose the zero profit condition does not hold.  In this case 3 p(i)q(i) $ qc(q). The
weighted average price is an upper bound to resource cost in the multiple price case, just as the
single price is when the law of one price holds.  
Suppose a good begins with one price and then has two. The methodology of the BLS in
constructing the CPI has generally been to treat the second price as a new good, and the price
difference as a reduction in utility, rather than a reduction in resource cost.  That is, the CPI in
effect treats the unrestricted or undiscounted price as the resource cost of production.  
Is that the case here? No. The resource cost is better measured by the weighted average
price.  Unfortunately, to know the weightedc average price we need to know the quantities sold at
each of the several prices. In the absence of data on the quantity sold at each price, any selection
rule is likely to be biased.
Why should the number of prices associated with a particular good increase?  
Deregulation and computerization are two reasons. Regulation often enforces a single price
regime artificially, so that with the lifting of regulation a multiplicity of prices appears. As argued
above, computerization may make it easier to price discriminate. This is true of airfares, car
rentals, and hotel rates, where computerized reservation systems permit discrimination across6
customers, dates, and bundles of purchases.  
An example: Air travel. In 1978, when our current methodology for the CPI was put in
place, there was only one round-trip coach fare on most routes, as fares were regulated by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. At present, by contrast, dozens of different fares are available with a
variety of restrictions on every route, and the fare structure changes by the minute. 
Between 1978 and 1996, the average price paid per mile by passengers grew at a 2.7
percent annual rate (Table 4). The CPI-U for airfares grew at an 8.3 percent annual rate, a
difference of 5.6 percentage points. If we use the CPI to deflate airline revenues from passenger
travel, we find that “real” airline passenger travel output fell from 1978 to 1996. But, in fact,
passenger miles on airlines more than doubled.  
How can such a substantial gap have been sustained for so long? The reason is the
dispersion of fares. Full fare for unrestricted travel has risen at nearly a 9 percent annual rate, and
the CPI for airfares has basically tracked the full fare. The average restricted (discount) fare has
increased at only 2 percent a year. The average domestic unrestricted fare is now 3.1 times as
much as the average restricted fare. But only 7 percent of passenger miles are flown at full fare
(full fares account for 20 percent of passenger revenues, because the average restricted fare is
only one-third as much as the average full fare). 
It can be argued that this constellation of fares is highly efficient. In essence, airlines have
divided their customers into two broad groups: business travelers and vacation travelers.
Business travelers, who care most about saving time, want to have the maximum possible flights
to a wide variety of destinations. They are willing to pay more for this privilege. Vacation
travelers, on the other hand, care most about saving money and are often flexible about exactly7
when they fly. The airlines accommodate both types of travelers, providing a multitude of flights
for business travelers and filling the seats with vacation travelers.  The typical restriction on
discount flights -- a Saturday overnight stay, which vacation travelers can often easily
accommodate -- is used to separate business travelers from vacation travelers. 
The proliferation of fares and restrictions also has costs. Consumers have to be careful
shoppers, planning their trips in advance and having to guess when to lock in a nonrefundable
fare. Changing plans has become more costly. There are ways to estimate the relative costs and
benefits of the proliferation of fares, but they are not simple. One approach is to directly measure
the cost of the restrictions to the flier, such as how much it costs to change the schedule (if a flier
could have a nonstop flight instead of a multistop flight for $50 more, the cost of that restriction
must be less than $50 to the flier). Another approach is time diary measures, which track
shopping times (the amount of time consumers spend searching for the lowest fares) and
compare them to estimated waiting times (the amount of time consumers save by having more
flights available).  A third approach is to measure the elasticities of demand for different types of
travelers, which gives us estimates of the travelers’ tradeoff between time and price.  A fourth
approach is to estimate the market structure of airline competition, to see where airlines have
market power and where competition reigns; this enables us to see how large the departure from
the zero profit condition might be. A fifth approach is to analyze and measure the role of the
various contributors to airline output: airplane manufacturers, travel agents, airlines, airports.
Using multiple approaches permits a more precise estimate of the inflation rate.
Consumer surplus, one good, two prices. We use Figure 1 for the discussion. Suppose a
good is sold at a single price, P  at time 0. Nominal sales are represented by the rectangle P Q .
0 008
The diagram assumes unitary demand elasticity, which implies under perfect competition
1
that changes in price for this product affect the demand for only this product. In turn, it follows
that the demand curve measures consumer surplus.  
Consumer marginal utility is reflected in the demand curve, through points A and B.  Then at
1
time 1, it is sold at two prices, P  and P , because the sellers are able to use some device to
01
separate buyers for the goods. If the sellers are able to perfectly price discriminate, then Q  - Q
10
purchases are made at the lower price. Consumer surplus will be ABD under perfect price
discrimination. P ABDP  represents the maximum consumer surplus under imperfect price
01
discrimination; it represents the consumer surplus if the price actually falls to P .  Note that to the
1
extent consumers actually pay the lower price, the arithmetic is precisely that of any other decline
in price.
The BLS methodology in this case would be to view the good with price P  as a different
0
good from the good with price P  and find no decline of price. For example, before 1978 airfares
1
were regulated and a single coach roundtrip fare between Los Angeles and New York prevailed.
But since then, deregulation and the institution of computerized reservation services have
permitted airlines to charge multiple fares. The BLS methodology was to measure the inflation
rate of the unrestricted roundtrip fare, considering the restricted roundtrip fares sold to vacation
travelers a separate good. This practice undermeasures consumer surplus.  The BLS practice of
ignoring the price decline is a correct application of the Laspeyres price index only if price
discrimination is perfect.
A lower bound to inflation, on the other hand, can be found if we consider the original
single price as the reservation price for the new good. Using the change from the original price to
the new lower price as the rate of inflation will overmeasure consumer surplus. As the airfares9
example shows, these upper and lower bounds can easily drift far apart. This is why a reasonably
precise measure of inflation cannot be obtained in the multiple price case without additional
information about the transactions.
The clearest examples of goods that have multiple prices are discount goods. Pashigian
studies the issue of why goods are sold at discount and argues that the data support either a thesis
of demand uncertainty (Lazear, 1986) or price discrimination (Chamberlin, 1948). Interestingly,
Pashigian’s data suggest that markdowns accelerated for goods in the 1980s.  The dollar value of
total markdowns as a percentage of dollar sales increased from 5.2 percent in 1955, to 6.1 percent
in 1965, 8.9 percent in 1975, and 16.1 percent in 1984. Compared to the undiscounted price, the
average price thus fell at a 0.1 percent annual rate from 1955 to 1965, at a 0.3 percent annual rate
from 1965 to 1975 and a 0.8 percent annual rate from 1975 to 1984.
Pashigian also reports that, according to data for 1986 from the Market Research
Corporation of America (11,500 consumers, panel, diary data) on men’s dress shirts, between 55
and 78 percent of all shirts were sold on sale, with an average percent markdown of between 34
and 48 percent for those sold on sale. Percent sold on sale peaks in January and July, with percent
markdowns highest in February and August. Thus sales are greatest at the end of the fall-winter
and spring-summer seasons. At a minimum, this suggests roughly a 19 percent markdown on the
average purchase.
Two firms, one good.   The issue discussed above concerns price differentials by the
producer of a differentiated good under conditions of free entry, a version of monopolistic
competition. Price differentials can also, of course, arise in the competition across similar goods
produced by different firms. The quote from the Stigler Price Review Committee in section I10
refers to such price differentials.
  Identical or nearly identical products can sell at sharp price differences because one
product has a brand name and the other is a generic or discounted product.  Steady increases in
cigarette prices during the 1980s, for example, led to the introduction of off-brand cigarettes. 
Consumers who choose a generic product over the branded product may experience a substantial
gain in consumer surplus or a little one. 
A striking example of the competition between a brand name and a discounted product
arises in the case of pharmaceuticals after the patent has expired on a brand name drug. In this
case, in the U.S., the generic competition has the authority of the Food and Drug Administration
attesting to its therapeutic equivalence with the brand name drug.
Griliches and Cockburn (1994) have closely examined at the wholesale level a small
group of pharmaceuticals whose patents have expired.  The typical behavior is that the price of
the brand-name patent drug stays relatively fixed and may even rise, while the generic
competition comes in at a substantially lower price and declines over time.  The generic
competition captures most of the market, but the brand name retains a substantial fraction of the
market.  In a detailed analysis of one of the drugs, Griliches and Cockburn show that the price for
Keflex (brand name for cephalexin) continued to rise after it went off patent, rising 24 percent,
despite competition from generic cephalexin. Generic cephalexin started at a price that was 54
percent of Keflex’s, and over the next three years fell by nearly half, to less than one-quarter of
Keflex’s price at that date. Generics captured five-sixths of the market in quantity terms, but
Keflex retained just over 45 percent of the revenue stream.
The BLS, until January 1995, treated the generic drug as a separate product worth only a11
fraction of the brand name product (the relative price of the generic at introduction) and would
likely have shown a rising price index for this drug.  But many purchasers are probably
indifferent to the brand name and would have experienced a pure price decline when the generic
became available.  An analysis of this example by Fisher and Griliches (1995) argues that the
most reasonable measure of the consumer surplus realized by purchasers who switched would
lead to a price index that declines 48 percent, compared with the Laspeyres approach, which
would show a price increase of 14 percent.  Over the 45 months covered in the study, this
represents an annual rate difference of 19 percentage points, for a product whose wholesale value
was 0.7 percent of the prescription market, so correcting the price mismeasurement on this one
drug alone could lower the annual inflation rate of the prescriptions index by 0.1 percentage
point.
Broadly speaking, drugs no longer under patent account for 70 percent of the dollar value
of the prescription market, so that these effects may be large (Caves et al, 1991).  Broader studies
of generic substitution by Caves et al (1991), and Grabowski and Vernon (1992) confirm the
outlines of the Keflex study for a wider range of drugs.  It is quite conceivable that redefining the
value of generics would lower the price level for prescription drugs 3 percentage points annually. 
Scherer (1993) estimates conservatively that the treatment of generics produces an annual
upward bias of 1.2 percent.  A further source of bias arises from drug manufacturers switching
prescription drugs to over-the-counter status, which also induces substantial consumer surplus
gains (Temin, 1992).   As with outlet differentials, unit values can be used to estimate an upward
bound on the bias in failing to link generic products with brand-name products.  Possible
intermediate assumptions are discussed in Fisher and Griliches (1995). The marketing of generic12
drugs in substantial numbers dates only from the passage of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act in 1984, so this phenomenon is an acceleration of mismeasurement
since that time.  In January 1995, the BLS revised its procedures for generic drugs.  Now the BLS
records a price decline from the brand name product to the generic when the generic
predominates.  This procedure should eliminate this part of the measurement bias in prescription
drugs.  No steps have been taken so far for drugs whose status changes from prescription to
nonprescription.
Are there important biases in the other direction? Shapiro and Wilcox (1996) argue that
there are important biases in the other direction. They discuss the problem of the failure of the
law of one price across firms as “the new-outlets effect.” They discern five cases in which an
incumbent is faced by an entrant.The entrant can enter with a low price product with high quality
(LH), with a low price product with low quality (LL), or a high price product with differentiated
quality (HD). The incumbent provides a high price product with high quality (HH). In response
to entry, the incumbent can stand pat (HH), lower price and maintain high quality (LH), lower
price and lower quality (LL).
The five cases they consider among the possibilities are listed in the matrix in Figure 2.
They ask: when should a lower price on the part of a new outlet be considered a decline in price?
Their response is that much of the time, the lower price is properly captured in the CPI. They
admit that in case 1, when the entrant has a low price and the incumbent has a high price, the
lower price is a decline in price, and would not be properly captured by the CPI. This is clearly
what was happening in the generic drug case.
What about cases 2 and 5? In these cases, the entrant lowers price, but the incumbent can13
duplicate the technology of the entrant. In case 2, when both the entrant and the incumbent lower
price and quality remains high, they argue that the CPI properly captures the decline in price, so
there is no bias. But they claim in case 5, when both entrant and incumbent lower price by
lowering quality, the CPI is biased downwards, registering a downward shift in price when the
fall in quality means there should be no such decline. Thus cases 2 and 5 imply that the example
of case 1 exaggerates the bias in the CPI.  
But this argument rests on the assumption that the incumbent can easily duplicate the
technology of the entrant, so that the law of one price holds. And if the incumbent can duplicate
the entrant’s technology there is no reason for successful entry. The thought experiment in cases
2 and 5 is simply an assertion that the law of one price holds. This is an empirical issue.
In cases 3 and 4, in contrast, there is a rationale for successful entry, as the entrant
increases variety. In case 3 the entrant provides a lower cost product with lower quality, while in
case 4 the entrant provides a high cost product with differentiated quality. In both cases the
entrant must be providing consumer surplus if it is displacing the incumbent, and in neither case
does the CPI register a decline in price, so the CPI is upwardly biased. Is the average
displacement price an accurate measure of the missing consumer surplus? If we believe that on
average unmeasured quality is deteriorating, then the average price overstates consumer surplus.
But is this the case? With average income per person or per household rising, one would expect
that on average unmeasured quality was improving. Thus on average, replacements by the entrant
are likely to be of rising quality, so that consumer surplus is understated.  
An advance in retail technology may very rapidly shift sales from one set of store-item
combinations to another, reducing per unit costs. For example, from 1987 to 1992, conventional14
department stores’ (including independents and national chains) share of general merchandise
sales fell from 44.2 percent to 34.7 percent, while discount stores’ (discount department stores
and miscellaneous general stores) share rose from 52.3 percent to 61.6 percent (the balance was
variety stores). Discount stores typically provide fewer sales personnel than the conventional
department stores. But the rapid increase in share of discount stores argues that, as with
McDonald’s burgers, consumers received substantial consumer surplus.  From 1980 to 1990, the
share of conventional supermarkets in grocery sales fell from 73.1 percent to 34.9 percent, while
the share of combination stores (stores that combine additional departments, such as drug,
delicatessen, and bakery units) rose from 21.7 percent to 47.5 percent and that of warehouse
stores rose from 5.2 percent to 17.6 percent.
Moulton (1996) makes a calculation that the change in outlets in retail food markets has
had only a minimal effect (0.1 percent annually) on food price inflation, using prices at
warehouse outlets and multiplying by the change in shares of such outlets. But the big change in
retail direction has been not to warehouses but to superstores, as we shall see below. And it is
possible for superstores to offer greater variety with higher markups on new items and low
average prices on commodity items, through devices such as specials and double coupon
discounting.  
III. GROCERY STORES
 Among all consumer prices, food prices have been collected for the longest time by
economists. The following extended example shows that our measures of food prices (narrowly
defined here as food purchased for consumption at home) went dramatically awry beginning in
1978. The argument takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum: our official statistics imply that15
the real output of retail services at supermarkets fell dramatically, but direct measures of
supermarket services rose substantially over this period.  
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics has been collecting monthly data on food prices since
World War I, when the CPI, then called the cost of living index, was institutionalized. Prior to
1978, the prices collected were for the same goods and services across all the cities surveyed.
Price inspectors throughout the country would collect prices for “milk, delivered, glass bottles,”
or “bacon, first quality, hand sliced.” Imposing a uniform definition nationally poses some
problems. Over long periods of time the quality of these goods might well vary, and indeed the
products might disappear altogether. Milk might be rich or watered or sour; first quality bacon in
one city might be second quality in another. And delivered milk has become a rare commodity in
most cities.
 In 1978, a new methodology replaced this uniform national specification of products by
decentralized specification of products. Price inspectors were asked to define detailed product
specifications in the field. The price inspectors were given broad product definitions, such as
flour and prepared flour mixes, and a store location based on a nationwide survey called the
Consumer Point of Purchase Survey. For example, the Survey and the randomization process
might result in the choice of the Acme supermarket at Germantown and Sedgwick in
Philadelphia. Then the price inspector, with the help of store personnel, would choose several
possible items, and using scientific sampling pick one, say, Betty Crocker Chocolate Fudge cake
mix. For the next five years the item priced by the price inspector would be that particular item at
that particular store (unless the store stopped carrying that item or closed).
The BLS also collects and publishes average price (AP) data on a selected group of foods. 16
This is a separate series that prices products (such as flour, white, all-purpose) that are relatively
broadly defined when compared to the very narrow product-store combinations priced in the CPI.
The AP series gives the average unit prices for these products (typically, prices per pound). The
prices are weighted by the relative sales of the outlets at which they are collected. The AP series
is apparently piggybacked on the CPI data, in the sense that the basic data in the AP series are, to
the extent possible, taken from the CPI collections.
The AP series, it should be pointed out, is essentially what economists have typically
collected historically. The AP series (except for a break from 1978 to 1980) is available going
back to 1890 (for nine foods).
Before the introduction of this new methodology in 1978, the CPI series and the AP
series showed no systematic tendency to diverge.  An economist at the BLS, Marshall Reinsdorf,
published an article in 1993 that has become one of the seminal articles in the area of CPI price
mismeasurement. He discovered that from 1980 to 1990, the CPI and AP series for comparable
products diverge by roughly 2 percentage points a year, with the CPI series rising faster than the
AP series. As can be seen in Table 5, the divergence over a recent 6-year period is quite
substantial for many of the products -- and the divergence is almost universally in the same
direction.   And as seen in Table 6, the roughly 2 percentage point a year divergence between the
two series continues to January 1996.  Reinsdorf (1994) reweights the AP series to make it
comparable to the total food-at-home category and finds that the price divergence shrinks but
remains substantial at 1.4 percentage points a year. 
 In principle, there are two reasons the CPI and the AP series might diverge. One is that
customers may be switching to lower quality goods within each product category. The other is17
that customers may be switching to less costly outlets for goods. And there is an additional
technical reason: the method that the BLS used to reweight goods when it updated its sample was
biased in the absence of the law of one price. This so-called “formula bias,” which apparently
accounted for 1/2 percentage point a year of the 1 ½ to 2 percentage point annual divergence, was
corrected in January 1995. Formula bias itself is a product of the failure of the law of one price.
One possible reason for the CPI to rise more rapidly than average prices is if consumers
are shifting to lower quality foods. We would have evidence of a switch to lower quality goods if
the CPI rate of increase were mirrored by an increase in the PPI for comparable goods. It is not.
The CPI series for food at home grows 1.4 percentage points faster from 1977 to 1992 than does
the PPI series for consumer food (Table 7).
Another possibility is that supermarkets’ retail services could be declining rapidly, if, for
example, variety were decreasing or service personnel were declining or if stores were becoming
more cramped as a result of changes in format. This is also not the case.  There has been some
switch to discount warehouse type stores, as shown in Table 8, but the greater switch has been to
the superstore format, in which the supermarket sells extensive additional lines of goods, such as
drugs, and provides additional services, such as a deli counter, fresh fish, flowers, and even
banking. In this enlarged format, supermarkets are larger (Table 9), stock more items (Table 10),
and have more employees (Table 11).  While some of the growth in number of products is due to
a shift toward more drugs and other nonfood products, most of it appears to be due to an increase
in variety of food products.
Consider the following. We can use the CPI for food commodities to deflate food store
sales for 1992 to measure the real value of food products and retail services delivered to18
consumers. Similarly, we can use the PPI for finished consumer foods to deflate 1992 food store
goods purchases to get a measure of the real value of products farms and manufacturers delivered
to food stores. The difference should be real retail services added by the food stores: the
economic contribution of supermarkets. This calculation, based on Table 12, is shown in Table
13, when we use this so-called “double-deflation” methodology to estimate the real contribution
of supermarket output. The implication of our official statistics is that food store output has been
declining at a 7.7 percent annual rate. This is absurd, because as I have shown along a variety of
dimensions, food store output has been increasing.
 In short, the CPI attributes declining real output to a retail segment that by every
conceivable measure has been rapidly providing an ever greater abundance of value-added
services.   This unreasonable result is the outcome of the clash between the CPI methodology put
in place in 1978, and the fact that foods do not obey the law of one price in our current retail
environment.
Independents vs. chains. Between 1954 and 1974, the shift from independent ownership
of supermarkets to chain ownership proceeded very slowly. The sales share of independents
declined from 42 percent to 38 percent, or roughly 10 percent. From 1974 to 1994, that sales
share declined from 38 percent to 26 percent or by nearly one-third.  
During the past decade and a half, chains have adopted information technology more
rapidly, notably indexed by more rapid adoption of scanners. Chains also have expanded their
hours of operation and sales floor area more rapidly and increased the amount of employment per
transaction (Table 14).  Thus all these indicators suggest a steady improvement in the service
provided to shoppers, rather than a decline in such service.   And the chains, which provided19
more of these services, expanded sales at the expense of the independents.
In sum, grocery stores have exhibited a high rate of innovation, and this innovation has
taken the form of increased services to customers. Customers have rewarded the innovators by
shifting swiftly towards them. The view that grocery stores retail services have been declining
seems simply untenable, and appears to be a product of substantial mismeasurement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Price discrimination has become very widespread in retailing.  Other rapidly changing
aspects of retailing include hours of operation, increases in product variety (rapid increases in
store-keeping units and UPC codes),  information exchange technology (scanners and electronic
data interchange), inventory management (just-in-time inventory techniques and inventory
management by manufacturers),  retail outlets (buying clubs and category killers), and retail
environments (regional malls and selling floor space).  The speed of these changes in retailing,
which themselves are in large part due to reduced costs of information processing,
communication, and transportation, weakens the a priori case for the standard method of
measuring inflation. 
The computerization of retailing has made price dispersion a norm in the United States,
so that any given list or transactions price of a product is an increasingly imperfect measure of its
resource cost. As a consequence, measuring the real output of retailers has become increasingly
difficult. Indeed, the very substantial revison of the CPI in 1978 may have worsened our
estimates of the inflation rate because it failed to take sufficient account of the failure of the law
of one price.   Food retailing is used as a case study to examine data problems in retail
productivity measurement. Crude direct measures of grocery store output suggest that the CPI for20
food-at-home may have been overstated by 1.4 percentage points annually from 1978 to 1996.
Food-at-home is the area of pricing where economists and government statisticians have had the
most experience; these goods are the ones where we have the best data and have concentrated
most of our efforts in pricing. Errors in other areas of pricing are likely to be even larger;













Figure 1.  Marshallian consumer surplus
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Table 1. Actual Purchases
1980 1990
Item Price Quantity Total Price Quantity Total
Old Good $10 1000 $10000 $12 5  $60
New Good $5 12 $60 $5 2000 $10,000
Total $10,060 $10,060
Average $9.94 1012 $10,060 $5.02 2005 $10,060
(unit) price
Table 2. CPI with and without law of one price
1980 1990
Item Price Quantity Total Price 1980 Total
Quantity
Old Good $10 1000 $10,000 $12 1000 $12,000
New Good $5 12 $60 $5 12 $60
total 1012 $10,060 2005 $12060
CPI with law of one price 1980 set 100 119.9
to 100
CPI without law of one 1980 set 100 50.5
price (unit price) to 100
Table 3. Output with and without law of one price, 1980 = 100
1980 199023
Item Price Quantity Total Price Quantity Total
Industry with law 100 $10,060 $10,060 119.9 $8390 $10,060
of one price
Industry without 100 $10,060 $10,060 50.5 $19,921 $10,060
law of one price
Table 4. Airfares
1964 1978 1996 Annual Annual
growth, growth,
1964-78 1978-96
CPI, annual 1982- 23.7 45.5 192.5 4.8 % 8.3 %
average 84=100
yield, cents full fare 38.9 ¢ 8.8 %
per  6.1 ¢ 8.5 ¢ 2.4 %
passenger-
mile
average 13.7 ¢ 2.7 %
restricted 12.0 ¢ 2.0 %
Sources: BLS and Air Transport Association.24
Table 5.  Average Prices of Foods Consistently Rise Less than the Consumer Price Index for
the Same Foods
 Selected Foods Consumer Price Index
Average Prices Per Pound, In Dollars
Category Jan Jan % Category Jan 1989
1989 1996 increase to Jan
1996 %
increase
Flour, white, all purpose $0.23 $0.26 14.9% Flour and prepared flour 27.7%
mixes
Ground chuck, 100% $1.81 $1.80 -0.4% Ground beef, excluding 7.9%
beef canned
Bacon, sliced $1.81 $2.14 18.5% Bacon 33.9%
Chicken, fresh, whole $0.91 $0.94 4.0% Fresh whole chicken 9.4%
Eggs, grade A, large $0.94 $1.15 22.7% Eggs 30.1%
Apples $0.73 $0.88 20.3% Apples 39.4%
Oranges,navel $0.52 $0.56 7.7% Oranges, including 46.4%
tangerines
Lettuce, iceberg $0.79 $0.77 -3.1% Lettuce 12.2%
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report, January 1989 and January 1996.
Table 6. Average Prices compared to Consumer Price Index25
1980 to 1989 1989 to 1996
(Reinsdorf) (Nakamura)
Average Prices, Selected Foods 2.1%  1.2% 
CPI, Same Selected Foods 4.2% 3.3%
Difference 2.1% 2.1%
Source: Reinsdorf, 1993, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report, January 1989
and January 1996.
Table 7. Comparison of CPI and PPI for foods
PPI, consumer CPI, food at PPI, annual rate CPI, annual rate
foods  home of growth from of growth from
1977=100 1977 = 100 previous period previous period
1959 47.4 46.7
1977 100 100 4.2% 4.3%
1992 168 205 3.5% 4.9%
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1997.
Table 8. Grocery Supermarkets by type
Percent of total 1980 1990 1993 1994
Conventional 73.1% 34.9% 28.0% 28.2%
Superstore 21.7% 47.6% 55.2% 56.6%
Warehouse 5.2% 17.6% 16.8% 15.2%
Total (billion $) $157 $260 $281 $289
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1996
Table 9. Selling Floor Space
(million sq ft)26
1972 1977 1987 1992
Grocery 545.7 606.1 747.6 844.1
Source: U.S. Census of Retail Trade, various years
Table 10. New Product Introductions and Number of Types of Items Stocked, Grocery
Supermarkets











1990 13244 16500 11611 17901
1992 16790
1993 15,751 20,299
1994 19,612 15,957 21,949
Source: Progressive Grocer, various issues, U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1996, and Moody, 1997.27
Table 11. Employment in Grocery Store Retail Industry, thousands
1983 1993 % Change
Total 2234 2852 27.6
Exec and admin 175 122 -30.1
Sales 933 1243 33.2
Admin support 611 770 26
Service occup 185 315 69.6
Other 329 402 22.2
Source: Moody, 1997
Table 12. Food Stores, Sales, Margin and Payroll (Millions of Dollars)
Sales Gross Annual Margin as Payroll as Non-
Margin Payroll Percent of Percent of Payroll
including Sales Sales Margin as
fringe Percent of
benefits Sales
1977 157,940 36,651 18,565 23.2% 11.8% 11.4%
1982 240,520 58,623 32,433 24.4% 13.5% 10.9%
1987 301,847 77,200 39,202 25.6% 13.0% 12.6%
1992 377,099 96,206 52,373 25.5% 13.9% 11.6%
1992 in 179,115 11,116
1977
dollars
Source: Census of Retail Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce28
Table 13.  Measures of Output and Hours: Food Stores
Annualized Growth Rates in Percent
BLS Hours BLS Double Double Deflation Output
Output Deflation with 3.5 % CPI inflation rate
Output for food
1977-92 1.7 % 0.9% -7.7 % 4.1 %
Source: BLS, Productivity Measures for Selected Industries and Government Services, July
1996, Bulletin 2480, and author’s calculations.
Table 14.  Performance Measures for Grocery Stores (Independents/Chains)
1982 1983 1990 1993 1994
Scanners 18/26 22/38 61/80 75/91 80/95
Hours Per 89/102 93/107 102/125 103/130 102/131
Week
Selling Area 13.1/20.6 13.3/21.3 14.8/25.3 15.9/29.1 16.4/31.6
(000 sq ft)
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